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Crisis atlas / MAR / 1980–1990

Morocco, 1980–1990

One crisis episode: distinct crisis years merged across gaps of up to two non-crisis years. Types, source agreement, and macro context are drawn from the union of five primary chronologies.

BankingCurrencySovereign debt

Crisis years in this episode

Every distinct (year, type) event inside the 1980–1990 window, with the chronologies flagging it and the count of agreeing sources. Start-year sources (GMD, JST) mark only the first year, so agreement falls in the continuation years.

  1. 1980
    Bankinggmd, laeven_valencia2 sources
  2. 1981
    Bankinglaeven_valencia1 source
    Currencygmd, laeven_valencia2 sources
  3. 1982
    Bankinglaeven_valencia1 source
  4. 1983
    Bankinglaeven_valencia, rr2 sources
    Sovereign debtgmd, laeven_valencia, rr3 sources
  5. 1984
    Bankinglaeven_valencia, rr2 sources
  6. 1985
    Currencyrr1 source
  7. 1986
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  8. 1987
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  9. 1988
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  10. 1989
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  11. 1990
    Sovereign debtgmd, laeven_valencia, rr3 sources

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Laeven-Valencia banking-crisis detail

Episode-level fiscal cost and output loss from the systemic banking crises database. Fiscal cost is the gross outlay of banking-sector rescues; output loss is the cumulative deviation of real GDP from its pre-crisis trend, both as a percent of GDP.

Banking episode 1980–1984
Not reported
Fiscal cost, % of GDP
21.9%
Output loss, % of GDP
1984
Episode end year

Source: Laeven & Valencia (2026), IMF WP/26/94, Systemic Banking Crises Database 1970-2025 Methodology

Macro context, 19731997

Seven years either side of the episode. Each panel has its own scale; the crisis window is shaded. Only indicators with data for Morocco in this window are shown. Bank credit growth (year over year in total loans) is available for the 18 Jordà-Schularick-Taylor advanced economies.

Inflation (% y/y)
01020197319801997
Real GDP growth (% y/y)
-1001020197319801997
Policy rate (%)
0510197319801997
Govt debt (% of GDP)
050100197319801997
Unemployment (%)
01020197319801997
Current account (% of GDP)
-20-10010197319801997

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 (credit) Real GDP growth is derived as the year-over-year change in real GDP; current account and government debt are percent of GDP; policy rate is the central-bank rate; bank credit growth is the year-over-year change in JST total loans. Methodology

How each source dates this episode

The chronologies disagree on start years and durations. This table is generated from the event rows, not curated: it lists, per crisis type, which source flags which years inside the window.

Banking
  • Global Macro Database1980
  • Laeven-Valencia1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984
  • Reinhart-Rogoff1983, 1984
Currency
  • Global Macro Database1981
  • Laeven-Valencia1981
  • Reinhart-Rogoff1985
Sovereign debt
  • Global Macro Database1983, 1990
  • Laeven-Valencia1983, 1990
  • Reinhart-Rogoff1983, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Documented policy responses

2 interventions from the Metrick-Schmelzing banking-crisis database whose recorded year falls inside this episode window (1980–1990). Each row is one documented government or central-bank action, tagged with the database’s own intervention categories and short code, under the crisis code it assigns. Matching is exact: same country, intervention year inside the window. The database’s global-crisis rows (no country) are never matched here.

MAR-1980Morocco
  1. 1980No interventionNO/I
MAR-1983Morocco
  1. 1983-1984Regulatory forbearance / rulesORL

Source: Metrick-Schmelzing Banking-Crisis Interventions Database (Yale Program on Financial Stability) Cite as: Metrick, Andrew, and Paul Schmelzing, "Banking-Crisis Interventions Across Time and Space," working paper, 2024 (dataset consulted 2026-07-10). License: Creative Commons attribution. Methodology

Policy-response case studies (external)

For qualitative accounts of how authorities intervened in systemic crises, see the Yale Program on Financial Stability New Bagehot Project, a library of financial-crisis intervention case studies. It is a separate qualitative resource; no specific case is asserted to match this episode.