Nigeria, 1981–1999

Crisis years in this episode

Every distinct (year, type) event inside the 1981–1999 window, with the chronologies flagging it and the count of agreeing sources. Start-year sources (GMD, JST) mark only the first year, so agreement falls in the continuation years.

1. 1981
   Currencyrr1 source
2. 1983
   Currencygmd, laeven_valencia2 sources

   Sovereign debtgmd, laeven_valencia2 sources
3. 1985
   Currencyrr1 source
4. 1986
   Currencyrr1 source
5. 1987
   Currencyrr1 source

   Sovereign debtrr1 source
6. 1988
   Currencyrr1 source

   Sovereign debtrr1 source
7. 1989
   Currencygmd, laeven_valencia, rr3 sources

   Sovereign debtrr1 source
8. 1990
   Currencyrr1 source

   Sovereign debtrr1 source
9. 1991
   Bankinggmd, laeven_valencia, rr3 sources

   Sovereign debtrr1 source
10. 1992
    Bankinglaeven_valencia, rr2 sources

    Currencyrr1 source

    Sovereign debtgmd, laeven_valencia, rr3 sources
11. 1993
    Bankinglaeven_valencia, rr2 sources

    Sovereign debtrr1 source
12. 1994
    Bankinglaeven_valencia, rr2 sources

    Sovereign debtrr1 source
13. 1995
    Bankinglaeven_valencia, rr2 sources
14. 1997
    Bankingrr1 source

    Currencygmd, laeven_valencia2 sources
15. 1999
    Currencyrr1 source

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Laeven-Valencia banking-crisis detail

Episode-level fiscal cost and output loss from the systemic banking crises database. Fiscal cost is the gross outlay of banking-sector rescues; output loss is the cumulative deviation of real GDP from its pre-crisis trend, both as a percent of GDP.

Source: Laeven & Valencia (2026), IMF WP/26/94, Systemic Banking Crises Database 1970-2025 Methodology

Macro context, 1974–2006

Seven years either side of the episode. Each panel has its own scale; the crisis window is shaded. Only indicators with data for Nigeria in this window are shown. Bank credit growth (year over year in total loans) is available for the 18 Jordà-Schularick-Taylor advanced economies.

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 (credit) Real GDP growth is derived as the year-over-year change in real GDP; current account and government debt are percent of GDP; policy rate is the central-bank rate; bank credit growth is the year-over-year change in JST total loans. Methodology

How each source dates this episode

The chronologies disagree on start years and durations. This table is generated from the event rows, not curated: it lists, per crisis type, which source flags which years inside the window.

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Documented policy responses

3 interventions from the Metrick-Schmelzing banking-crisis database whose recorded year falls inside this episode window (1981–1999). Each row is one documented government or central-bank action, tagged with the database’s own intervention categories and short code, under the crisis code it assigns. Matching is exact: same country, intervention year inside the window. The database’s global-crisis rows (no country) are never matched here.

Source: Metrick-Schmelzing Banking-Crisis Interventions Database (Yale Program on Financial Stability) Cite as: Metrick, Andrew, and Paul Schmelzing, "Banking-Crisis Interventions Across Time and Space," working paper, 2024 (dataset consulted 2026-07-10). License: Creative Commons attribution. Methodology

Policy-response case studies (external)

For qualitative accounts of how authorities intervened in systemic crises, see the Yale Program on Financial Stability New Bagehot Project, a library of financial-crisis intervention case studies. It is a separate qualitative resource; no specific case is asserted to match this episode.