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Sovereign debt / BLR

Belarus

Latest government debt 44.4% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). No sovereign-debt crisis in the chronologies.

Country financial profile →

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Belarus’s latest debt of 44.4% is below the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry one of the world’s highest ratios without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 7 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Mar 11, 2022Category 7 of 7current
Jan 26, 2018Category 6 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 7 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0 marks high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies whose credit is priced on market terms. This layer shows category 0 and a blank row as the same exempt state, so an exempt reading is not a zero-risk rating and does not on its own separate an exemption from a market the OECD never classified.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt to GDP trajectory

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Household and nonfinancial corporate IMF GDD series are plotted separately where reported. Where neither component is reported, the private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published) is shown as a coverage fallback, not as a third private component. No sovereign-debt crisis years fall in this window.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)
% of GDP

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; household and nonfinancial corporate GDD series are plotted separately. Where both components are unavailable, the fallback is private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published). Crisis-year shading comes from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
44.4% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
36.7% (2022)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
38.7% (2024)
History
Peak debt
58.2% (2011)
Sovereign crises
0
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
-36.3

External debt (World Bank IDS)

External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (Belarus is classified Upper middle income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.

$34.22B
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (2024)
46.1%
External debt stocks (% of GNI) (2024)
$5.34B
Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$) (2024)
10.5%
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (2024)
29.0%
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
9.4%
Multilateral debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
26.1%
Total reserves (% of total external debt) (2024)
YearTotal external debt% of GNIDebt service
2015$38.26B70.8%$4.98B
2016$37.52B82.5%$6.22B
2017$39.58B75.2%$4.41B
2018$38.77B67.0%$5.79B
2019$40.73B65.2%$4.51B
2020$41.79B71.0%$4.29B
2021$41.65B62.1%$4.34B
2022$39.86B56.4%$6.81B
2023$36.77B52.4%$7.93B
2024$34.22B46.1%$5.34B

Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Belarus’s government debt in default in 2024, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $15.04B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2024)Amount in default
Paris Club (bilateral official)$10.53B
Foreign-currency bonds$3.92B
World Bank (IBRD)$500.0M
China (official)$48.0M
Other private creditors$30.0M
Other official creditors$15.0M
Total external$15.04B

In default (external) for 31 distinct years between 1993 and 2024. Peak external default stock: $15.04B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

No sovereign-debt crisis is recorded for Belarus in the five chronologies (banking or currency crises, if any, are on the full crisis page).

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

No sovereign-debt restructuring on record for Belarus in the Cruces–Trebesch haircut database (1815 to present).

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1950) the GMD historical series.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.