Sovereign haircuts / SEN
Senegal
4 concluded restructurings, between 1984 and 1996. The earliest default they settle began in 1981. The worst cost creditors 92.0% of the present value of their claim, in 1996. The longest gap between a default and its settlement was 4 years.
Every restructuring
Two measures of the same deals, never combined. The present-value haircut discounts what creditors got against what they were owed; the face-value reduction counts only principal written off.
| Default | Settled | Years to settle | Present-value haircut | Face-value reduction | Debt treated (2020 $) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 1984 | 3 | 28.8% | 0.0% | $165M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1985 | 1985 | 0 | 31.3% | 0.0% | $41M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1990 | 1990 | 0 | 35.7% | 0.0% | $66M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1992 | 1996 | 4 | 92.0% | 92.0% | $124M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016) Debt treated is the amount restructured, deflated to constant 2020 US dollars in the source file. A negative haircut means the new instruments were worth more than the old claim. Methodology
Default spells
| Spell | From | To | Years | Restructurings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEN_1981-1985 | 1981 | 1985 | 5 | 2 |
| SEN_1990-1996 | 1990 | 1996 | 7 | 2 |
Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016) Duration counts both endpoints. The spells table also carries a cumulative-haircut column; it is not published here because it does not reconcile with the per-episode haircuts, see the methodology. Methodology
The Cruces-Trebesch record: a third measure and the discount rate
The Cruces-Trebesch file carries 4 restructurings here, and adds the market haircut (the new instruments against the face value of the old claim, undiscounted) and the exit yield used to do the discounting. The deal label is the file’s own and is finer than the country: it names the instrument class the deal covered. The two files were assembled separately, so a deal here need not line up one-to-one with a row above.
| Deal | Date | Present value | Market | Face value | Exit yield | Structure | Data quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Senegal | 1984-02-01 | 28.8% | 28.8% | 0.0% | 23.9% | - | 2 / 5 |
| Senegal | 1985-05-01 | 31.3% | 35.1% | 0.0% | 24.3% | - | 3 / 5 |
| Senegal | 1990-09-01 | 35.7% | 35.7% | 0.0% | 27.0% | - | 3 / 5 |
| Senegal | 1996-12-01 | 92.0% | 92.0% | 92.0% | none (buy back) | buyback | 2 / 5 |
Source: Cruces & Trebesch, haircut dataset (2014 update) Data quality is the file's own 1-to-5 index of how well the deal terms are documented. Methodology
Debt still in default
The Bank of Canada-Bank of England default database records no debt in default for Senegal in its latest year.
Source: Bank of Canada-Bank of England Sovereign Default Database (CRAG) Bank of Canada terms (attribution). Includes domestic arrears, so it is not comparable with the debt-treated column above. Methodology
Restructurings with Chinese creditors
1 restructuring with a Chinese creditor is recorded here. No haircut is attached to any of them, so they cannot be placed on the scale above; the file records only whether face value or the interest rate was cut.
| Year | Type | Creditor | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Debt rescheduling only | China Ex-Im Bank | China Ex-Im Bank extends a grace period extension on a RMB 531 million loan to the Government of Senegal for Phase 2 of the 90kV Dakar Electricity Distribution Network Rehabilitation and Extension Project. The original terms of the China Ex-Imbank loan were as follows: 20-year maturity, 7 year grace period, and a 2% interest rate. The exact length of the grace period extension is unknown. |
Source: Horn, Reinhart & Trebesch, China's overseas lending and debt restructurings Methodology