Chinese overseas lending
In 3 countries, a drawn Chinese central-bank swap equals more than 40% of the reserves the market watches
In 2021, the last year of the Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch panel, 10countries carried drawn balances on People’s Bank of China swap lines, totalling $38.90bn. Set against gross international reserves (World Bank FI.RES.TOTL.CD, which includes gold), the drawn balance equals 51.5% of Argentina’s, 50.0% of Sri Lanka’s and 43.0% of Mongolia’s. 3 of the 10 exceed 40%, counted one by one below. A swap drawing is a liability to another central bank, and a gross reserves figure is gross: it does not net liabilities out.
Drawn PBoC swap balances against gross reserves, 2021
Both columns are stocks in the same year, from two sources. The ratio says the drawn balance is that large relative to gross reserves. It does not say the reserves are composed of the swap: the reserves figure includes gold and every other reserve asset, and the two series are not consolidated with each other.
| Country | Drawn swap | Gross reserves | Drawn as % of gross reserves |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | $20.41bn | $39.65bn | 51.5% |
| Sri Lanka | $1.57bn | $3.14bn | 50.0% |
| Mongolia | $1.88bn | $4.38bn | 43.0% |
| Pakistan | $4.71bn | $22.81bn | 20.6% |
| Suriname | $157m | $992m | 15.8% |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | $300m | $1.95bn | 15.4% |
| Egypt | $2.83bn | $39.82bn | 7.1% |
| Turkey | $5.49bn | $111.18bn | 4.9% |
| Nigeria | $520m | $41.73bn | 1.2% |
| Malaysia | $1.03bn | $116.92bn | 0.9% |
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending (estimated stocks), and World Bank World Development Indicators, FI.RES.TOTL.CD, total reserves including gold (reserves). Selection: drawn PBoC swap-line balances in 2021 (the panel's last year, derived not typed), joined to gross international reserves including gold for the same country-year. Reserves are left-joined and render n/a where the World Bank has no figure, never 0. Methodology
The estimated stock, by instrument, 2000 to 2021
Summed over all 126 borrowers, the estimated stock owed to China reaches $472.10bn in 2021: $320.74bn public and publicly guaranteed, $112.47bn private non-guaranteed (23.8% of the total), and $38.90bn in drawn swap balances (8.2%). The three bands add to the total by construction, and that additivity was checked against the panel rather than assumed.
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending. Selection: estimated stock owed to China, summed over all 126 borrowers, by year and instrument. Methodology
Borrowers grouped by their largest estimated stock in any year of the panel, 2000 to 2021. The four groups sum to 126.
Where the stock sits, 2021
Largest in dollars
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending. Selection: estimated total stock owed to China in 2021, top 12 borrowers by dollars. Methodology
Largest relative to the borrower’s economy
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending. Selection: estimated total stock owed to China as a percent of borrower GDP in 2021, top 12. Borrowers whose GDP the source leaves missing are excluded from this ranking rather than shown at zero. Methodology
Where one creditor’s estimate exceeds every creditor’s reported total
The two records cannot be subtracted from each other, so this page does not compute a “hidden debt gap”. What can be tested is a bound: an estimate of what one creditor is owed cannot exceed what the borrower reports owing to all creditors. In 2021 that bound breaks for 3 of the 102 borrowers present in both sources. Eritrea’s estimated external debt to China ($2.14bn) is 277.5% of its entire reported external debt stock ($772m). On the like-for-like public and publicly guaranteed comparison, Iran’s estimated PPG owed to China ($9.88bn) is 2972.2% of its reported PPG stock to all creditors ($332m). Either the borrower’s Debtor Reporting System record is incomplete or the estimate is wrong. This page does not pick a winner, and the reasons are set out on the two-sources page.
| Country | Est. owed China, external | Reported to all creditors | Ratio, % | Est. owed China, PPG | Reported PPG, all creditors | Ratio, % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eritrea | $2.14bn | $772m | 277.5% | $488m | $691m | 70.6% |
| Equatorial Guinea | $1.63bn | $1.50bn | 109.2% | $1.63bn | $1.13bn | 144.0% |
| Iran | $10.25bn | $10.35bn | 99.1% | $9.88bn | $332m | 2972.2% |
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending (estimated stocks), and World Bank International Debt Statistics, borrower-reported via the Debtor Reporting System (all-creditor stocks). Selection: estimated external and PPG stock owed to China in 2021 against borrower-reported DT.DOD.DECT.CD and DT.DOD.DPPG.CD for the same year; rows shown are those where either estimate exceeds the reported all-creditor stock. Swap drawings are excluded from both numerators: they are a central-bank liability the Debtor Reporting System's long-term-debt concepts do not carry, and including them would manufacture violations. Methodology
What this cannot tell you
- How much of China’s lending the World Bank data misses. That difference is not computable. The International Debt Statistics table in this estate carries exactly 24 indicator codes, listed in full on the two-sources page, and none of them breaks debt down by creditor country. “Debt owed to China” does not exist as an IDS series here, so no China-versus-IDS difference can be defined. A ratio and the bound above are the only comparisons the data supports.
- Whether a borrower outside the IDS universe is concealing anything. 24 of the 126 borrowers have no row in the IDS table at all. They hold $95.29bn of the 2021 stock (20.18% of the total), of which Russia alone is $67.50bn, or 70.8% of that. That is a difference in the scope of the two datasets, not evidence of anything hidden.
- The true stock owed to China.Every China figure on these pages is an estimate reconstructed from loan-level commitment records, with maturities and grace periods imputed by creditor entity and instrument type. Per the source’s own documentation it excludes short-term trade debt and portfolio debt, and it does not account for missed principal payments. The World Bank figures it is compared against are reported by the borrowers themselves and are built on different concepts. The two are never added, never subtracted, and never netted.
- Anything after 2021. The panel ends there. The World Bank and reserves series in this estate run later.
- How much was written off. The 55 Chinese restructuring deals recorded across 29 countries (2000 to 2020) appear on the country pages as context only. Face-value reduction is a 0/1 flag in the source, not a magnitude, and only 4 of the 55 deals carry it. No haircut percentage exists for these deals, so none is shown and nothing is netted against a stock.
How this fits the rest of the site
- /reserves is the currency composition of world allocated reserves (IMF COFER). It does not carry the country-level gross reserves the headline here is measured against, so the two do not overlap.
- /sovereign owns debt in default, including a China creditor class. That is arrears, and the estimated stocks here do not account for missed principal payments at all, so the two cannot be summed and neither validates the other.