FinObservatory

Sovereign haircuts

What creditors lose when a government defaults

329 sovereign-debt restructurings concluded in 94 countries between 1823 and 2024. The loss creditors took is read off the terms of each deal rather than assumed, and it is read off in more than one way: this page keeps the measures apart. For the probability side of the same question, see sovereign debt.

329
Restructurings
94
Countries
1823-2024
Record spans
37.0%
Median present-value haircut
0.0%
Median face-value reduction

The median restructuring writes off nothing and still costs creditors 37.0%

165 of the 329 restructurings cut the face value of the debt by exactly zero, which is why the median face-value reduction is 0.0% while the median present-value haircut is 37.0%. The present-value haircut compares the discounted value of the new instruments with the discounted value of the old claim, so it prices maturity extension and coupon reduction, both of which a face-value measure records as nothing. It exceeds the face-value reduction in 267 of 329 episodes. 9 restructurings carry a negative present-value haircut, meaning the new instruments were worth more at the exit yield than the claim they replaced, and 4 carry a negative face-value reduction, meaning principal rose. Neither column is clamped at zero here.

050100150200<-10-100102030405060708090100Haircut, % (bin lower edge; 10-point bins)
Present-value haircutFace-value reductionVertical axis: number of restructurings.

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016), Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default Both series cover the same 329 episodes; the bars are two measures of the same deals, not two samples. Methodology

The two-century record, 1823 to 2024

Every restructuring in the file, on the year it concluded, sized by the debt it treated. The record is not evenly filled: 1950-1979 holds 19 restructurings across 17 countries, while 1980-1999 holds 142 across 61. The era table below carries the coverage.

-2002040608010018251850187519001925195019752000Year the restructuring concludedPresent-value haircut, %
Restructuring (area = debt treated, constant 2020 US dollars)Outright repudiation

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016), Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default Methodology

EraRestructuringsCountriesMedian PV haircutMedian face-value cutZero face-value cutMedian years to settleDebt treated (2020 $)
1823-1899652450.5%7.7%24 of 655$133.54B
1900-1949563441.1%7.1%23 of 565$132.20B
1950-1979191760.6%49.3%4 of 1916$19.11B
1980-19991426131.5%0.0%102 of 1422$1.20T
2000-2024473041.2%22.0%12 of 471$567.30B

The eras are not one dataset. The 136 episodes sourced to Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch run 1823 to 1993; the 174 sourced to Cruces and Trebesch run 1940 to 2013. Nothing before 1940 comes from the Cruces-Trebesch construction, and the exit yield that construction discounts at is carried only in the Cruces-Trebesch file, for 166 of its 187 episodes. The long-run file has no discount-rate column at all. The heading over the haircut column is the same from 1823 to 2024; the reconstruction behind it is not.

The biggest losses

By present-value haircut

CountrySettledPVFace2020 $
Russiarepudiated1917100.0%100.0%$28.44B
Chinarepudiated1939100.0%100.0%$4.89B
Spainrepudiated1823100.0%100.0%$2.90B
Mexicorepudiated1865100.0%100.0%$2.87B
Portugalrepudiated1834100.0%100.0%$801M
Cubarepudiated1960100.0%100.0%$356M
Dominican Republicrepudiated1872100.0%100.0%$163M
Latviarepudiated1940100.0%100.0%$130M
Lithuaniarepudiated1940100.0%100.0%$112M
Honduras192599.9%96.0%$311M
Greece187898.2%100.0%$1.41B
Romania195998.2%97.3%$1.39B

By debt treated, constant 2020 dollars

CountrySettled2020 $PVFace
Greece2012$295.72B64.6%53.5%
Brazil1988$119.02B18.4%0.0%
Mexico1987$103.76B18.1%0.0%
Mexico1990$96.51B30.5%13.1%
Argentina2005$78.30B76.8%29.4%
Brazil1994$69.55B29.3%9.1%
Argentina2020$66.24B34.6%0.0%
Mexico1985$59.32B2.2%0.0%
Argentina1987$58.56B21.7%0.0%
Argentina1993$46.76B32.5%9.5%

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016), Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default PV = present-value haircut, Face = face-value reduction. Both are properties of the same deal and are never combined. Methodology

Two haircuts for the same deal, and the discount rate decides

The Cruces-Trebesch file carries 187 restructurings from 1978 to 2013 with two haircuts for each one. The present-value haircut discounts both the old claim and the new instruments at the exit yield. The market haircut compares the new instruments with the face value of the old claim, leaving the old claim undiscounted. They differ on 92 of the 187 episodes, and where they differ the market haircut is the larger in 78 of 92 cases, by up to 22.2 percentage points. The medians are 32.5% and 40.3%. The exit yield doing the discounting is not a technicality: it ranges from 7.9% to 41.2% across the 166 episodes that have one, with a median of 14.8%. Averaging the two measures together would be meaningless, so this page never does.

-20-20002020404060608080100100Present-value haircut, % (discounted at the exit yield)Market haircut, %
The two measures agree on this line

Source: Cruces & Trebesch, haircut dataset (2014 update) 21 of the 187 episodes carry no exit yield. Methodology

The data says which measure is which. If the old claim has already fallen due, its present value is its face value, so discounting it changes nothing and the two haircuts must coincide. That is exactly what happens: all 94 episodes flagged as having all debt fallen due have the two measures equal, and only 1 of the other 93 does. That is the signature of a present-value haircut that discounts the old claim against a market haircut that does not, and it is consistent with the market haircut being the larger of the two in 78 of the 92 episodes where they differ.

Where the two measures diverge most

DealYearPresent-value haircutMarket haircutFace-value reductionExit yield
Nigeria199140.1%62.3%34.6%18.3%
Ecuador200038.3%59.8%33.9%17.3%
Uruguay199126.3%47.2%16.4%16.7%
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire)198950.6%70.2%0.0%28.1%
Madagascar198713.7%32.4%0.0%22.8%
Philippines199225.4%43.7%13.2%13.6%
Venezuela199036.7%52.8%6.8%16.6%
Turkey198217.0%32.9%0.0%27.4%

Source: Cruces & Trebesch, haircut dataset (2014 update) Methodology

Do the two files mean the same thing by “haircut”? Yes. 160 episodes appear in both the long-run file and the Cruces-Trebesch file under an iso3-year that is unique on both sides. 158 of those 160 agree on the present-value haircut to within 0.05 points and all 160 agree on the face-value reduction, so the two tables' haircut columns are the same measure and the naming is not a trap. The 2 exceptions are Yugoslavia 1984 (-1.3% against -7.5%) and Russia 1997 (0.0% against 26.2%). Both figures are shown on the country pages; neither is averaged away.

And how long it takes

A default spell is the file's grouping of a country's restructurings into one episode of default. There are 206 of them across 93 countries. The median lasts 8 years, the mean 11.3, and the longest 64. 21 spells opened and closed inside a single year; 64 needed more than one restructuring, and the worst needed 7. In 2000-2024 the median spell ran 3 years against 11 in 1823-1899.

The endpoints are close to, but not exactly, the obvious reading. A spell's end year is the year of its last restructuring in 203 of the 206 spells, and its start year is the earliest default year of those restructurings in 205 of 206. Duration counts both endpoints in all 206.

Longest default spellsFromToYearsRestructurings
Argentina18301893643
Honduras18731925531
Greece18271878521
Ecuador19071955492
Nicaragua18281874471
Spain18231867453
Honduras18281867401
Yugoslavia19321967361

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016), Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default The spells table covers 93 of the 94 countries with a restructuring. 1 spell id referenced by an episode has no row in the spells table: ALB_1991-1995 (Albania). Methodology

China cut face value 4 times in 55

China's own restructurings of its overseas loans are recorded separately, with no haircut attached: 55 deals in 29 countries between 2000 and 2020, of which 49 are typed “debt rescheduling only”, 4 cut face value, and 2 have no type recorded. 10 of the 55 cut the interest rate. The file records no present-value haircut for any of them, so the loss China took cannot be compared with the numbers above. What can be said is how often principal was reduced: 4 times in 55.

The 4 deals that cut face valueYearCreditorInterest cut too
Serbia2003Sinochemyes
Serbia2009Multiplenot recorded
Iraq2010Multiplenot recorded
Cuba2016Multiplenot recorded

Source: Horn, Reinhart & Trebesch, China's overseas lending and debt restructurings 17 of the 29 countries in China's restructuring record also have a restructuring in the haircut file. The interest-rate flag is set or absent, never zero, so "not recorded" is not the same as "no". Methodology

What is missing: the defaults that have not ended

Only restructurings that concluded are in this data. A haircut cannot be computed until there is a deal to compute it on, so every default still running is absent by construction, and the sample tilts toward defaults that got resolved. The Bank of Canada-Bank of England default database measures the other side of that line: in 2024 it records 104 governments in default on $542.63B of debt. Only 9 restructurings in the haircut file concluded from 2020 onward, and 44 of the 104 countries in default in 2024 have no concluded restructuring in the haircut file at any date in 1823-2024.
Largest stocks in default, 2024Debt in defaultLast concluded restructuring in the haircut file
Venezuela$96.43B1990
Iraq$53.98B2006
Russia$49.85B2000
Lebanon$42.96Bnone in the file
Pakistan$36.23B1999
Iran$30.42Bnone in the file
Sri Lanka$30.06Bnone in the file
Ukraine$28.30B2016
Ethiopia$16.46B1996
Belarus$15.04Bnone in the file
Cuba$14.46B1985
Ghana$13.08B2024

Source: Bank of Canada-Bank of England Sovereign Default Database (CRAG) Bank of Canada terms (attribution). Amounts are the stock of debt in default across all creditor classes, including domestic arrears, so they are not comparable with the debt-treated column above. Methodology

Every country with a restructuring

94 countries have at least one concluded restructuring in the file and get a page. A country with no episode gets no page.

CountryRestructuringsFirstLastMedian PV haircutWorst PV haircutLongest spell
Mexico151831199030.5%100.0%33 yr
Ecuador131855202041.2%78.4%49 yr
Costa Rica111840199045.6%84.0%21 yr
Nicaragua111874200741.7%95.5%47 yr
Peru91849199742.2%91.8%25 yr
Venezuela91840199036.7%92.4%35 yr
Brazil9185119946.0%46.1%22 yr
Dominican Republic81872200542.2%100.0%13 yr
Chile81842199038.4%80.0%18 yr
Poland81938199433.8%91.9%32 yr
Argentina81857202031.4%76.8%64 yr
Uruguay81878200320.1%26.3%9 yr
Turkey71881198260.3%95.4%19 yr
Democratic Republic of the Congo71980198935.4%50.6%15 yr
Jamaica71978199018.1%44.0%14 yr
Colombia61845194173.1%96.6%20 yr
El Salvador61860194645.5%83.6%33 yr
Guatemala61856193642.7%56.6%29 yr
Nigeria61983199124.7%41.5%10 yr
Serbia and Montenegro61895200415.9%70.9%36 yr
Greece51878201264.6%98.2%52 yr
Portugal51834190250.5%100.0%11 yr
Paraguay51885199347.3%64.4%12 yr
Cuba51938198544.2%100.0%6 yr
Liberia51898200940.0%97.0%30 yr
Ukraine51998201618.0%23.2%3 yr
Belize52007202112.6%31.5%2 yr
Honduras41867200185.1%99.9%53 yr
Bolivia41880199381.4%92.7%27 yr
Russia41917200051.5%100.0%10 yr
Mozambique41991202343.0%90.0%25 yr
Spain41823188236.7%100.0%45 yr
Philippines41986199234.0%42.8%10 yr
Senegal41984199633.5%92.0%7 yr
Romania41959198632.3%98.2%27 yr
Madagascar41981199030.1%52.7%10 yr
Bulgaria31926199456.3%90.8%23 yr
Cote d'Ivoire31998201255.2%62.8%30 yr
Niger31984199145.8%82.0%9 yr
Morocco31986199023.5%40.3%8 yr
Egypt31876188017.0%34.1%5 yr
Panama31940199616.8%34.9%13 yr
South Africa31987199312.7%22.0%5 yr
Guyana21992199990.1%91.0%18 yr
Zambia21994202476.3%89.0%12 yr
Czechoslovakia21946196471.5%92.9%13 yr
Togo21988199769.2%92.3%7 yr
Congo21988200766.5%90.8%25 yr
Austria21923195263.2%83.0%15 yr
Guinea21988199856.5%87.0%8 yr
Hungary21937196856.0%56.2%27 yr
China21937193950.0%100.0%17 yr
Moldova22002200446.6%56.3%4 yr
Grenada22005201538.0%42.0%3 yr
Germany21938195337.8%51.7%16 yr
Malawi21983198833.9%39.2%2 yr
Chad22015201819.1%27.3%2 yr
Algeria21992199616.1%23.5%7 yr
Suriname22020202314.7%28.6%4 yr
Gabon21987199412.1%16.2%9 yr
Pakistan21999199911.6%11.6%2 yr
Latvia119401940100.0%100.0%5 yr
Lithuania119401940100.0%100.0%1 yr
Yemen12001200197.0%97.0%19 yr
Ethiopia11996199692.0%92.0%7 yr
Mauritania11996199690.0%90.0%5 yr
Sao Tome and Principe11994199490.0%90.0%11 yr
Bosnia and Herzegovina11997199789.6%89.6%6 yr
Iraq12006200689.4%89.4%21 yr
Sierra Leone11995199588.6%88.6%16 yr
Tanzania12004200488.0%88.0%24 yr
Uganda11993199388.0%88.0%15 yr
Italy11947194785.7%85.7%8 yr
Cameroon12003200385.5%85.5%19 yr
Albania11995199580.4%80.4%no spell row
Saint Kitts and Nevis12012201262.9%62.9%2 yr
Seychelles12010201056.2%56.2%3 yr
Jordan11993199354.6%54.6%5 yr
Sudan11985198554.6%54.6%11 yr
Dominica12004200454.0%54.0%2 yr
Vietnam11997199752.0%52.0%16 yr
Gambia11988198849.3%49.3%5 yr
Kenya11998199845.7%45.7%7 yr
Ghana12024202445.4%45.4%3 yr
Macedonia11997199734.6%34.6%6 yr
Japan11952195226.8%26.8%12 yr
Barbados12019201923.7%23.7%2 yr
Trinidad and Tobago11989198915.5%15.5%2 yr
Thailand11947194712.0%12.0%7 yr
Croatia11996199611.0%11.0%5 yr
Finland1194519453.7%3.7%6 yr
Slovenia1199519953.3%3.3%4 yr
Zimbabwe1198019800.0%0.0%16 yr
Mongolia120172017-9.6%-9.6%1 yr

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016), Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default Country label is the name attached to the country's most recent episode, so Serbia's 19th- and 20th-century episodes are filed under the label of its 2004 deal. Methodology

Methodology, the measures, and what this data cannot tell you