Sovereign haircuts / UKR
Ukraine
5 concluded restructurings, between 1998 and 2016. The earliest default they settle began in 1998. The worst cost creditors 23.2% of the present value of their claim, in 2016. The longest gap between a default and its settlement was 1 year.
Every restructuring
Two measures of the same deals, never combined. The present-value haircut discounts what creditors got against what they were owed; the face-value reduction counts only principal written off.
| Default | Settled | Years to settle | Present-value haircut | Face-value reduction | Debt treated (2020 $) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998 | 1998 | 0 | 11.8% | 0.0% | $632M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1999 | 1999 | 0 | -8.3% | 5.7% | $242M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 2000 | 2000 | 0 | 18.0% | 0.9% | $2.32B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 2015 | 2016 | 1 | 23.2% | 22.7% | $16.02B | Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) |
| 2015 | 2016 | 1 | 19.2% | 20.0% | $548M | Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) |
Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016) Debt treated is the amount restructured, deflated to constant 2020 US dollars in the source file. A negative haircut means the new instruments were worth more than the old claim. Methodology
Default spells
| Spell | From | To | Years | Restructurings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UKR_1998-2000 | 1998 | 2000 | 3 | 3 |
| UKR_2015-2016 | 2015 | 2016 | 2 | 2 |
Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016) Duration counts both endpoints. The spells table also carries a cumulative-haircut column; it is not published here because it does not reconcile with the per-episode haircuts, see the methodology. Methodology
The Cruces-Trebesch record: a third measure and the discount rate
The Cruces-Trebesch file carries 4 restructurings here, and adds the market haircut (the new instruments against the face value of the old claim, undiscounted) and the exit yield used to do the discounting. The deal label is the file’s own and is finer than the country: it names the instrument class the deal covered. The two files were assembled separately, so a deal here need not line up one-to-one with a row above.
| Deal | Date | Present value | Market | Face value | Exit yield | Structure | Data quality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine (OVDPs, non-resid.) | 1998-09-01 | 11.8% | 13.1% | 0.0% | 13.3% | bond exchange | 5 / 5 |
| Ukraine (Chase loan) | 1998-10-01 | 14.7% | 14.7% | 0.0% | 14.3% | - | 5 / 5 |
| Ukraine (ING loan) | 1999-08-01 | -8.3% | -8.3% | 5.7% | 14.2% | - | 5 / 5 |
| Ukraine (Global Exchange) | 2000-04-01 | 18.0% | 16.8% | 0.9% | 16.3% | bond exchange | 5 / 5 |
Source: Cruces & Trebesch, haircut dataset (2014 update) Data quality is the file's own 1-to-5 index of how well the deal terms are documented. Methodology
Debt still in default
$28.30B across 4 creditor classes in 2024. A haircut can only be measured once a restructuring concludes, so any of this that is still being negotiated is by construction absent from the tables above.
| Creditor class | In default, 2024 |
|---|---|
| Foreign-currency bonds | $27.46B |
| Other private creditors | $703.7M |
| China (official) | $95.0M |
| Domestic (fiscal) arrears | $34.0M |
Source: Bank of Canada-Bank of England Sovereign Default Database (CRAG) Bank of Canada terms (attribution). Includes domestic arrears, so it is not comparable with the debt-treated column above. Methodology
Restructurings with Chinese creditors
2 restructurings with Chinese creditors are recorded here. No haircut is attached to any of them, so they cannot be placed on the scale above; the file records only whether face value or the interest rate was cut.
| Year | Type | Creditor | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Debt rescheduling only | China Ex-Im Bank | In 2014, China Ex-Im Bank rescheduled a 2011 buyer's credit loan extended to SC National Project 'Airexpress', a special purpose vehicle established and guaranteed by the Ukrainian government to carry out the Aeriel Express Project. The original borrowing terms were as follows: 15-year maturity, 3-year grace period, and an interest rate of 6-month LIBOR plus a 3.5% margin. When the project ran into financial difficulties and Ukraine's Ministry of Finance failed to honor its guarantee, China Ex-Im Bank agreed to a 2-year grace period extension. |
| 2017 | Debt rescheduling only | China Ex-Im Bank | In 2017, China Ex-Im Bank restructured debt under a 2012 3 bn USD credit line with the State Food Grain Corporation of Ukraine (SFGCU) and Ukraine's Ministry of Agriculture (the "loan-for-grain" deal). The contract specified that the $3 billion China Ex-Im Bank loan was to be repaid within 15 years using the proceeds from grain supply contracts between SFGCU and China National Complete Engineering Corporation (CCEC). The first tranche of 1.5 bn USD of the credit line was disbursed with the following financial terms: an interest rate of 6-month LIBOR plus a 4.5% margin, a maturity of 15 years, and a 5 year grace period. Due to loan repayment difficulties, SFGCU and China Ex-Im Bank agreed in 2017 to reduce the loan’s interest rate margin by 150 bps. |
Source: Horn, Reinhart & Trebesch, China's overseas lending and debt restructurings Methodology