FinObservatory

Sovereign haircuts / ZWE

Zimbabwe

One concluded restructuring, settled in 1980. It cost creditors 0.0% of the present value of their claim, 15 years after the default that began in 1965.

1
Restructurings
0.0%
Median present-value haircut
0.0%
Worst present-value haircut
0 of 1
Cut face value by zero
$834M
Debt treated (2020 $)

Every restructuring

Two measures of the same deals, never combined. The present-value haircut discounts what creditors got against what they were owed; the face-value reduction counts only principal written off.

0204060801001980Year the restructuring concluded
Present-value haircutFace-value reduction
DefaultSettledYears to settlePresent-value haircutFace-value reductionDebt treated (2020 $)Source
19651980150.0%18.8%$834MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016) Debt treated is the amount restructured, deflated to constant 2020 US dollars in the source file. A negative haircut means the new instruments were worth more than the old claim. Methodology

Default spells

SpellFromToYearsRestructurings
ZWE_1965-198019651980161

Source: Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2022), Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo | Cruces & Trebesch (2013), Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts | Asonuma & Trebesch (2016) Duration counts both endpoints. The spells table also carries a cumulative-haircut column; it is not published here because it does not reconcile with the per-episode haircuts, see the methodology. Methodology

Debt still in default

$8.60B across 7 creditor classes in 2024. A haircut can only be measured once a restructuring concludes, so any of this that is still being negotiated is by construction absent from the tables above.

Creditor classIn default, 2024
Other private creditors$4.01B
Paris Club (bilateral official)$1.78B
World Bank (IBRD)$1.13B
China (official)$591.0M
Other official creditors$586.0M
World Bank (IDA)$419.0M
Foreign-currency bonds$87.0M

Source: Bank of Canada-Bank of England Sovereign Default Database (CRAG) Bank of Canada terms (attribution). Includes domestic arrears, so it is not comparable with the debt-treated column above. Methodology

Restructurings with Chinese creditors

5 restructurings with Chinese creditors are recorded here. No haircut is attached to any of them, so they cannot be placed on the scale above; the file records only whether face value or the interest rate was cut.

YearTypeCreditorTerms
2003Debt rescheduling onlyChina Ex-Im BankFirst rescheduling of the 1997 China Ex-Im Bank buyer's credit to ZISCO. The agreement reduced interest rates by 300 bps. from 7 to 4 percent per year and extended the maturity by 3 years.
2004Debt rescheduling onlyChina Ex-Im BankIn 2004, China Ex-Im Bank restructured a RMB 48.2 mn Government Concessional Loan to the Government of Zimbabwe’s Industrial Development Commission (IDC). The loan carried the following original loan terms: a 15-year maturity, 5-year grace period, and 3% interest rate. The 2004 agreement reduced the interest rate by 100 bps. and extended the maturity by 4 years.
2007Debt rescheduling onlyChina Ex-Im BankSecond rescheduling of the 1997 buyer's credit loan to ZISCO that had already been restructured in 2003. The 2007 agreement introduced an additiona 3-year grace period.
2010Debt rescheduling onlyChina Ex-Im BankThird rescheduling of the 1997 buyer's credit loan to ZISCO that had already been restructured in 2003 and 2007. The 2010 agreement extended the grace period by another 3 years.
2012Debt rescheduling onlyChina Ex-Im BankIn 2012, China Ex-Im Bank restructured a 2006 200 mn USD buyer's credit for an Agricultural Supply Project. The loan originally carried a 5-year grace period, an 11-year maturity and was supposed to be repaid by export procceds from platinum. The 2012 restructuring agreement granted an additional 3-year grace period after Zimbabwe had failed to repay the loan in time.

Source: Horn, Reinhart & Trebesch, China's overseas lending and debt restructurings Methodology

Methodology, the measures, and what this data cannot tell you