Sovereign debt / CHL
Chile
Latest government debt 42.0% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 6 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1826 to 1990.
Official risk classification
| Effective | Classification |
|---|---|
| Jul 25, 2014 | Exempt (high-income, market terms)current |
| Jan 1, 1999 | Category 2 of 7 |
The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.
Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology
Debt trajectory, 1980 onward
Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.
Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology
Debt profile
- General government (IMF GDD)
- 42.0% (2024)
- Central government (IMF GDD)
- 41.6% (2024)
- General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
- 41.6% (2024)
- Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
- 139.0% (2024)
- Peak debt
- 43.1% (1990)
- Sovereign crises
- 6
- Last crisis
- 1990
- Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
- -38.7
External debt (World Bank IDS)
No IDS external-debt series for Chile. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics covers low- and middle-income borrowing economies only, so high-income economies are absent by construction.
Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)
Stock of Chile’s government debt in default in 1990, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $6.49B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).
| Creditor class (1990) | Amount in default |
|---|---|
| Foreign-currency bank loans | $6.49B |
| Total external | $6.49B |
In default (external) for 18 distinct years between 1961 and 1990. Peak external default stock: $8.76B.
Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology
Sovereign-debt crisis history
Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).
- 1983–19901980–1999Debt at start: 45.2% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
- 1972–19751950–1979Debt at start: 10.0% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
- 1961–19651950–1979Debt at start: 7.9% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
- 1931–1947Pre-1950Debt at start: 94.4% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
- 1880–1883Pre-1950Debt at start: 30.3% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
- 1826–1842Pre-1950No debt reading at startepisode →
Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology
Restructuring history and creditor losses
Every recorded Chile sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.
| Year | Haircut (NPV) | Face value | Debt restructured | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1842 crisis → | 45.2% | 7.7% | $8.3M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1884 | 80.0% | 0.0% | $33.3M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1935 crisis → | 47.9% | 0.0% | $562.6M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1948 | 75.9% | 0.0% | $198.4M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1984 crisis → | 8.4% | 0.0% | $1.16B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1986 crisis → | 31.7% | 0.0% | $6.01B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1987 crisis → | 14.3% | 0.0% | $5.90B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1990 crisis → | 17.0% | 0.0% | $6.49B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology
Reading this profile
- Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
- Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
- Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.