FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / CHL

Chile

Latest government debt 42.0% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 6 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1826 to 1990.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Chile’s latest debt of 42.0% is below the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Exempt
unclassified by design · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jul 25, 2014Exempt (high-income, market terms)current
Jan 1, 1999Category 2 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
05010015020019501960198020002024PrivateGen govtWEO grossCentral

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
42.0% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
41.6% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
41.6% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
139.0% (2024)
History
Peak debt
43.1% (1990)
Sovereign crises
6
Last crisis
1990
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
-38.7

External debt (World Bank IDS)

No IDS external-debt series for Chile. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics covers low- and middle-income borrowing economies only, so high-income economies are absent by construction.

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Chile’s government debt in default in 1990, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $6.49B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (1990)Amount in default
Foreign-currency bank loans$6.49B
Total external$6.49B

In default (external) for 18 distinct years between 1961 and 1990. Peak external default stock: $8.76B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 1983–19901980–1999
    Debt at start: 45.2% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1972–19751950–1979
    Debt at start: 10.0% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1961–19651950–1979
    Debt at start: 7.9% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1931–1947Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 94.4% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1880–1883Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 30.3% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1826–1842Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Chile sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1842 crisis →45.2%7.7%$8.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
188480.0%0.0%$33.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1935 crisis →47.9%0.0%$562.6MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
194875.9%0.0%$198.4MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1984 crisis →8.4%0.0%$1.16BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1986 crisis →31.7%0.0%$6.01BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1987 crisis →14.3%0.0%$5.90BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1990 crisis →17.0%0.0%$6.49BCruces and Trebesch (2013)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.