FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / CRI

Costa Rica

Latest government debt 60.2% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 7 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1828 to 1990.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Costa Rica’s latest debt of 60.2% is below the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 3 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Oct 11, 2024Category 3 of 7current
Jun 25, 2020Category 4 of 7
May 2, 2000Category 3 of 7
Mar 19, 1999Category 4 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 5 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
02040608019501960198020002024Gen govtCentralWEO grossPrivate

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
60.2% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
59.8% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
58.9% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
55.7% (2024)
History
Peak debt
68.1% (2021)
Sovereign crises
7
Last crisis
1990
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
-20.5

Quarterly debt (World Bank QPSD)

A higher-frequency companion to the annual IMF figures above: general government gross debt, quarter by quarter, from the World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database.

Latest quarter (General government)
60.8%
2025Q4 · $63.14B
Annual, for comparison (General government (IMF GDD))
60.2%
2024 · different perimeter and valuation
20.040.060.080.02010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

QPSD and the annual IMF WEO/GDD series are not the same measure: coverage of the public sector and the valuation of instruments (nominal, face or market value) can differ, so a quarterly QPSD reading and an annual IMF reading for the same period need not match. Read the quarterly line as within-year timing, not as a re-statement of the annual ratio.

Source: World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt (QPSD) World Bank QPSD, CC BY 4.0. General government gross debt, percent of GDP; 2009Q3 to 2025Q4. Methodology

External debt (World Bank IDS)

No IDS external-debt series for Costa Rica. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics covers low- and middle-income borrowing economies only, so high-income economies are absent by construction.

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Costa Rica’s government debt in default in 2014, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $320K (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2014)Amount in default
Other official creditors$320K
Total external$320K

In default (external) for 41 distinct years between 1962 and 2014. Peak external default stock: $2.53B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 1981–19901980–1999
    Debt at start: 32.3% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 19621950–1979
    Debt at start: 19.7% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1932–1952Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 9.8% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1901–1911Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 3.1% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1895–1897Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1874–1885Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1828–1840Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Costa Rica sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1840 crisis →53.4%53.8%$93KMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1885 crisis →82.2%59.7%$22.1MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1897 crisis →82.8%5.3%$10.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1910 crisis →27.2%44.8%$11.7MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1933 crisis →28.2%0.0%$13.4MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1935 crisis →27.9%8.4%$8.8MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1937 crisis →45.6%50.0%$332KMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1952 crisis →84.0%35.1%$14.4MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1983 crisis →39.4%0.0%$609.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1985 crisis →35.6%0.0%$440.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1990 crisis →71.9%47.0%$1.38BCruces and Trebesch (2013)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.