Sovereign debt / ECU
Ecuador
Latest government debt 43.0% of GDP (2018, Central govt (IMF GDD)). 8 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1830 to 2009.
Official risk classification
| Effective | Classification |
|---|---|
| Oct 22, 2021 | Category 6 of 7current |
| Jun 25, 2020 | Category 7 of 7 |
| Oct 17, 2014 | Category 6 of 7 |
| Mar 19, 1999 | Category 7 of 7 |
| Jan 1, 1999 | Category 6 of 7 |
The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0 marks high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies whose credit is priced on market terms. This layer shows category 0 and a blank row as the same exempt state, so an exempt reading is not a zero-risk rating and does not on its own separate an exemption from a market the OECD never classified.
Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology
Debt to GDP trajectory
Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Household and nonfinancial corporate IMF GDD series are plotted separately where reported. Where neither component is reported, the private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published) is shown as a coverage fallback, not as a third private component. Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.
Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; household and nonfinancial corporate GDD series are plotted separately. Where both components are unavailable, the fallback is private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published). Crisis-year shading comes from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology
Debt profile
- Central government (IMF GDD)
- 43.0% (2018)
- General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
- 54.1% (2024)
- Private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published)
- 58.7% (2024)
- Peak debt
- 74.9% (1999)
- Sovereign crises
- 8
- Last crisis
- 2009
- Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
- -37.7
External debt (World Bank IDS)
External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (Ecuador is classified Upper middle income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.
| Year | Total external debt | % of GNI | Debt service |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | $28.41B | 29.7% | $5.10B |
| 2016 | $35.40B | 36.9% | $5.38B |
| 2017 | $41.17B | 40.3% | $6.62B |
| 2018 | $44.97B | 43.0% | $9.15B |
| 2019 | $51.91B | 49.7% | $9.39B |
| 2020 | $56.40B | 60.9% | $9.30B |
| 2021 | $58.12B | 55.1% | $6.60B |
| 2022 | $60.68B | 53.1% | $5.33B |
| 2023 | $61.66B | 52.1% | $8.27B |
| 2024 | $60.36B | 49.7% | $8.49B |
Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology
Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)
Stock of Ecuador’s government debt in default in 2024, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $52.0M (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline). A further $463.0M of domestic (fiscal) arrears is tracked separately and is not included in that total.
| Creditor class (2024) | Amount in default |
|---|---|
| Foreign-currency bonds | $52.0M |
| Total external | $52.0M |
In default (external) for 50 distinct years between 1972 and 2024. Peak external default stock: $23.60B.
Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology
Sovereign-debt crisis history
Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).
- 2008–20092000 onwardDebt at start: 20.8% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
- 1999–20001980–1999Debt at start: 74.9% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
- 1982–19951980–1999Debt at start: 30.9% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
- 1929–1954Pre-1950Debt at start: 13.0% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
- 1906–1924Pre-1950No debt reading at startepisode →
- 1894–1898Pre-1950No debt reading at startepisode →
- 1868–1890Pre-1950No debt reading at startepisode →
- 1830–1845Pre-1950No debt reading at startepisode →
Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology
Restructuring history and creditor losses
Every recorded Ecuador sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.
| Year | Haircut (NPV) | Face value | Debt restructured | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1855 | 70.7% | 26.1% | $18.1M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1892 | 68.2% | 65.9% | $10.5M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1895 crisis → | 55.0% | 1.3% | $3.8M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1897 crisis → | 25.8% | 62.3% | $3.2M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1908 crisis → | 3.4% | 1.0% | $11.4M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1955 | 78.4% | 71.3% | $7.3M | Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022) |
| 1983 crisis → | 6.3% | 0.0% | $970.0M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1984 crisis → | 5.7% | 0.0% | $350.0M | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1985 crisis → | 15.4% | 0.0% | $4.22B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 1995 crisis → | 42.2% | 16.4% | $7.17B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 2000 crisis → | 38.3% | 33.9% | $6.70B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 2009 crisis → | 67.7% | 68.6% | $3.19B | Cruces and Trebesch (2013) |
| 2020 | 41.2% | 15.0% | $18.38B | Authors' Calculations; Consent Solicitation Documents and Government Press Releases, accessed via Luxembourg Stock Exchange. |
Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology
Reading this profile
- Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1950) the GMD historical series.
- Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
- Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.