Sovereign debt / KAZ
Kazakhstan
Latest government debt 24.8% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). No sovereign-debt crisis in the chronologies.
Official risk classification
| Effective | Classification |
|---|---|
| Feb 4, 2019 | Category 5 of 7current |
| Jan 29, 2016 | Category 6 of 7 |
| Oct 23, 2009 | Category 5 of 7 |
| Jan 21, 2005 | Category 4 of 7 |
| Oct 24, 2003 | Category 5 of 7 |
| Oct 27, 2000 | Category 6 of 7 |
| Jan 22, 1999 | Category 7 of 7 |
| Jan 1, 1999 | Category 6 of 7 |
The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0 marks high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies whose credit is priced on market terms. This layer shows category 0 and a blank row as the same exempt state, so an exempt reading is not a zero-risk rating and does not on its own separate an exemption from a market the OECD never classified.
Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology
Debt to GDP trajectory
Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Household and nonfinancial corporate IMF GDD series are plotted separately where reported. Where neither component is reported, the private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published) is shown as a coverage fallback, not as a third private component. No sovereign-debt crisis years fall in this window.
Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; household and nonfinancial corporate GDD series are plotted separately. Where both components are unavailable, the fallback is private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published). Crisis-year shading comes from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology
Debt profile
- General government (IMF GDD)
- 24.8% (2024)
- Central government (IMF GDD)
- 24.9% (2024)
- General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
- 24.4% (2024)
- Household (IMF GDD)
- 17.1% (2024)
- Nonfinancial corporate (IMF GDD)
- 15.5% (2024)
- Peak debt
- 38.9% (1993)
- Sovereign crises
- 0
- Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
- -55.9
Quarterly debt (World Bank QPSD)
A higher-frequency companion to the annual IMF figures above: central government gross debt, quarter by quarter, from the World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database. Kazakhstan does not report the general-government perimeter to QPSD, so this is central government (a narrower perimeter that excludes state, local and social-security debt).
QPSD and the annual IMF WEO/GDD series are not the same measure: coverage of the public sector and the valuation of instruments (nominal, face or market value) can differ, so a quarterly QPSD reading and an annual IMF reading for the same period need not match. Read the quarterly line as within-year timing, not as a re-statement of the annual ratio.
Source: World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt (QPSD) World Bank QPSD, CC BY 4.0. Central government gross debt, percent of GDP; 2020Q3 to 2025Q4. Methodology
External debt (World Bank IDS)
External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (Kazakhstan is classified Upper middle income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.
| Year | Total external debt | % of GNI | Debt service |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | $156.15B | 90.4% | $35.26B |
| 2016 | $166.98B | 134.8% | $20.72B |
| 2017 | $163.07B | 109.7% | $28.50B |
| 2018 | $161.17B | 102.5% | $34.33B |
| 2019 | $170.70B | 107.4% | $34.12B |
| 2020 | $172.89B | 110.8% | $32.90B |
| 2021 | $173.39B | 100.3% | $32.72B |
| 2022 | $169.57B | 84.8% | $49.78B |
| 2023 | $171.48B | 72.9% | $47.65B |
| 2024 | $167.53B | 62.6% | $46.33B |
Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology
Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)
Stock of Kazakhstan’s government debt in default in 2020, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $10.9M (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).
| Creditor class (2020) | Amount in default |
|---|---|
| China (official) | $10.9M |
| Total external | $10.9M |
In default (external) for 9 distinct years between 1993 and 2020. Peak external default stock: $388.1M.
Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology
Sovereign-debt crisis history
No sovereign-debt crisis is recorded for Kazakhstan in the five chronologies (banking or currency crises, if any, are on the full crisis page).
Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology
Restructuring history and creditor losses
No sovereign-debt restructuring on record for Kazakhstan in the Cruces–Trebesch haircut database (1815 to present).
Reading this profile
- Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1950) the GMD historical series.
- Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
- Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.