FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / OMN

Oman

Latest government debt 35.5% of GDP (2024, Central govt (IMF GDD)). No sovereign-debt crisis in the chronologies.

Oman’s latest debt of 35.5% is below the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 3 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jan 30, 2026Category 3 of 7current
Feb 2, 2024Category 4 of 7
Jan 28, 2022Category 5 of 7
Jan 29, 2021Category 6 of 7
Jan 31, 2020Category 5 of 7
Jan 26, 2018Category 4 of 7
Jan 29, 2016Category 3 of 7
Oct 22, 2004Category 2 of 7
Jul 12, 2001Category 3 of 7
Jun 17, 1999Category 4 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 3 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). No sovereign-debt crisis years fall in this window.

Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
0501001501972198019902000201020202024PrivateCentralWEO gross

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
Central government (IMF GDD)
35.5% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
35.5% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
79.3% (2024)
History
Peak debt
67.9% (2020)
Sovereign crises
0
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
-45.2

External debt (World Bank IDS)

No IDS external-debt series for Oman. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics covers low- and middle-income borrowing economies only, so high-income economies are absent by construction.

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

No external debt in default recorded for Oman in the BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database (1960 onward).

Sovereign-debt crisis history

No sovereign-debt crisis is recorded for Oman in the five chronologies.

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

No sovereign-debt restructuring on record for Oman in the Cruces–Trebesch haircut database (1815 to present).

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.