FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / SDN

Sudan

Latest government debt 272.0% of GDP (2024, Central govt (IMF GDD)). 2 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1979 to 1985.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Sudan’s latest debt of 272.0% is 191.3 points above the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 7 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jan 1, 1999Category 7 of 7current

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
020040060019601980200020202024CentralWEO grossPrivate

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
Central government (IMF GDD)
272.0% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
262.6% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
8.6% (2022)
History
Peak debt
495.2% (1992)
Sovereign crises
2
Last crisis
1985
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
+191.3

External debt (World Bank IDS)

External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (Sudan is classified Low income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.

$22.02B
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (2024)
45.4%
External debt stocks (% of GNI) (2024)
$200.7M
Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$) (2024)
3.0%
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (2022)
21.5%
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
10.0%
Multilateral debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
0.8%
Total reserves (% of total external debt) (2017)
YearTotal external debt% of GNIDebt service
2015$21.66B42.8%$523.1M
2016$21.36B51.1%$294.0M
2017$21.97B55.4%$245.1M
2018$21.80B71.4%$215.1M
2019$22.84B74.4%$195.6M
2020$23.81B93.2%$147.6M
2021$22.98B69.9%$3.06B
2022$22.44B44.4%$188.5M
2023$22.58B58.0%$207.5M
2024$22.02B45.4%$200.7M

Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Sudan’s government debt in default in 2024, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $10.23B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2024)Amount in default
Foreign-currency bank loans$5.71B
Paris Club (bilateral official)$3.96B
China (official)$555.0M
Total external$10.23B

In default (external) for 50 distinct years between 1975 and 2024. Peak external default stock: $32.49B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Sudan sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1985 crisis →54.6%0.0%$920.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.