FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / SLV

El Salvador

Latest government debt 87.6% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 5 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1828 to 1996.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

El Salvador’s latest debt of 87.6% is 6.9 points above the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 6 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Oct 10, 2025Category 6 of 7current
Oct 21, 2022Category 7 of 7
Oct 22, 2021Category 6 of 7
Oct 30, 2015Category 5 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 4 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
05010015019501960198020002024Gen govtWEO grossCentralPrivate

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
87.6% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
56.2% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
87.4% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
55.9% (2024)
History
Peak debt
95.4% (2020)
Sovereign crises
5
Last crisis
1996
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
+6.9

Quarterly debt (World Bank QPSD)

A higher-frequency companion to the annual IMF figures above: general government gross debt, quarter by quarter, from the World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database.

Latest quarter (General government)
n/a
2025Q4 · $20.96B
Annual, for comparison (General government (IMF GDD))
87.6%
2024 · different perimeter and valuation
40.050.060.070.02010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

QPSD and the annual IMF WEO/GDD series are not the same measure: coverage of the public sector and the valuation of instruments (nominal, face or market value) can differ, so a quarterly QPSD reading and an annual IMF reading for the same period need not match. Read the quarterly line as within-year timing, not as a re-statement of the annual ratio.

Source: World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt (QPSD) World Bank QPSD, CC BY 4.0. General government gross debt, percent of GDP; 2009Q4 to 2025Q4. Methodology

External debt (World Bank IDS)

External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (El Salvador is classified Upper middle income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.

$24.96B
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (2024)
75.4%
External debt stocks (% of GNI) (2024)
$11.58B
Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$) (2024)
96.2%
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (2024)
10.6%
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
26.3%
Multilateral debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
14.8%
Total reserves (% of total external debt) (2024)
YearTotal external debt% of GNIDebt service
2015$15.60B69.8%$1.31B
2016$16.58B72.3%$1.41B
2017$17.19B72.9%$3.81B
2018$16.69B68.0%$3.55B
2019$17.37B68.0%$5.62B
2020$18.49B78.5%$5.16B
2021$20.34B74.4%$5.80B
2022$21.19B70.8%$3.37B
2023$22.86B72.1%$9.20B
2024$24.96B75.4%$11.58B

Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of El Salvador’s government debt in default in 2023, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $1.45B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2023)Amount in default
Foreign-currency bonds$1.45B
Total external$1.45B

In default (external) for 25 distinct years between 1979 and 2023. Peak external default stock: $6.03B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 1981–19961980–1999
    Debt at start: 39.5% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1932–1946Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 68.8% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1921–1922Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 37.6% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1898Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1828–1860Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded El Salvador sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1860 crisis →68.5%65.0%$349KMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
189925.9%0.0%$3.6MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
192312.0%0.0%$4.4MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1932 crisis →29.2%0.0%$15.7MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1936 crisis →61.8%25.0%$18.1MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1946 crisis →83.6%29.4%$11.4MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.