FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / TUN

Tunisia

Latest government debt 83.1% of GDP (2024, Central govt (IMF GDD)). 4 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1867 to 1982.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Tunisia’s latest debt of 83.1% is 2.4 points above the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 7 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jul 1, 2022Category 7 of 7current
Jan 31, 2020Category 6 of 7
Jan 27, 2017Category 5 of 7
Jan 25, 2013Category 4 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 3 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)
02550751001970198019902000201020202024WEO grossCentral

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
Central government (IMF GDD)
83.1% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
85.7% (2024)
History
Peak debt
83.1% (2024)
Sovereign crises
4
Last crisis
1982
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
+2.4

External debt (World Bank IDS)

External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (Tunisia is classified Lower middle income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.

$40.46B
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (2024)
77.7%
External debt stocks (% of GNI) (2024)
$5.51B
Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$) (2024)
26.2%
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (2024)
39.4%
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
31.5%
Multilateral debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
22.5%
Total reserves (% of total external debt) (2024)
YearTotal external debt% of GNIDebt service
2015$28.20B63.2%$1.85B
2016$29.53B68.0%$2.09B
2017$33.71B81.9%$3.07B
2018$35.25B84.6%$3.01B
2019$40.22B98.6%$3.21B
2020$41.98B102.1%$3.26B
2021$43.02B93.8%$4.37B
2022$41.04B93.3%$4.19B
2023$42.41B90.2%$4.92B
2024$40.46B77.7%$5.51B

Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Tunisia’s government debt in default in 2015, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $270K (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline). A further $2.98B of domestic (fiscal) arrears is tracked separately and is not included in that total.

Creditor class (2015)Amount in default
Other official creditors$270K
Total external$270K

In default (external) for 29 distinct years between 1970 and 2015. Peak external default stock: $82.3M.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 1979–19821950–1979
    Debt at start: 33.6% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 19631950–1979
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1956–19581950–1979
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1867–1870Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

No sovereign-debt restructuring on record for Tunisia in the Cruces–Trebesch haircut database (1815 to present).

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.