FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / URY

Uruguay

Latest government debt 58.3% of GDP (2024, Central govt (IMF GDD)). 7 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1876 to 2003.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Uruguay’s latest debt of 58.3% is below the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 3 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jul 1, 2011Category 3 of 7current
Jun 29, 2007Category 4 of 7
Jun 29, 2006Category 5 of 7
Oct 25, 2002Category 6 of 7
Jun 27, 2002Category 5 of 7
May 2, 2000Category 3 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 4 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
025507510019501960198020002024WEO grossCentralPrivate

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
Central government (IMF GDD)
58.3% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
67.5% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
34.0% (2024)
History
Peak debt
86.2% (2003)
Sovereign crises
7
Last crisis
2003
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
-22.4

Quarterly debt (World Bank QPSD)

A higher-frequency companion to the annual IMF figures above: central government gross debt, quarter by quarter, from the World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database. Uruguay does not report the general-government perimeter to QPSD, so this is central government (a narrower perimeter that excludes state, local and social-security debt).

Latest quarter (Central government)
63.6%
2025Q4 · $57.30B
Annual, for comparison (Central government (IMF GDD))
58.3%
2024 · different perimeter and valuation
55.060.065.070.0202020212022202320242025

QPSD and the annual IMF WEO/GDD series are not the same measure: coverage of the public sector and the valuation of instruments (nominal, face or market value) can differ, so a quarterly QPSD reading and an annual IMF reading for the same period need not match. Read the quarterly line as within-year timing, not as a re-statement of the annual ratio.

Source: World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt (QPSD) World Bank QPSD, CC BY 4.0. Central government gross debt, percent of GDP; 2019Q3 to 2025Q4. Methodology

External debt (World Bank IDS)

No IDS external-debt series for Uruguay. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics covers low- and middle-income borrowing economies only, so high-income economies are absent by construction.

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Uruguay’s government debt in default in 2003, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $4.90B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2003)Amount in default
Foreign-currency bonds$4.90B
Total external$4.90B

In default (external) for 9 distinct years between 1965 and 2003. Peak external default stock: $4.90B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 2002–20032000 onward
    Debt at start: 84.0% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1983–19911980–1999
    Debt at start: 21.2% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 19651950–1979
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1932–1938Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 30.1% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1915–1921Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 35.3% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1891Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 96.4% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1876–1878Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 28.7% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Uruguay sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1878 crisis →16.4%0.0%$16.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1891 crisis →20.0%-4.5%$79.7MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
193925.4%5.8%$117.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1983 crisis →0.7%0.0%$575.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1986 crisis →24.3%0.0%$1.96BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1988 crisis →20.3%0.0%$1.77BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1991 crisis →26.3%16.4%$1.61BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
2003 crisis →9.8%0.0%$3.13BCruces and Trebesch (2013)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.