FinObservatory

Crisis atlas / PER / 1826–1850

Peru, 1826–1850

One crisis episode: distinct crisis years merged across gaps of up to two non-crisis years. Types, source agreement, and macro context are drawn from the union of five primary chronologies.

Sovereign debt

Crisis years in this episode

Every distinct (year, type) event inside the 1826–1850 window, with the chronologies flagging it and the count of agreeing sources. Start-year sources (GMD, JST) mark only the first year, so agreement falls in the continuation years.

  1. 1826
    Sovereign debtgmd, rr2 sources
  2. 1827
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  3. 1828
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  4. 1829
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  5. 1830
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  6. 1831
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  7. 1832
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  8. 1833
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  9. 1834
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  10. 1835
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  11. 1836
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  12. 1837
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  13. 1838
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  14. 1839
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  15. 1840
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  16. 1841
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  17. 1842
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  18. 1843
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  19. 1844
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  20. 1845
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  21. 1846
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  22. 1847
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  23. 1848
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  24. 1850
    Sovereign debtgmd, rr2 sources

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Laeven-Valencia banking-crisis detail

Laeven-Valencia reports fiscal cost and output loss for systemic banking crises only. This episode involves sovereign debt crises, for which no comparable cost figures exist in the source chronologies.

Macro context, 18191857

Seven years either side of the episode. Each panel has its own scale; the crisis window is shaded. Only indicators with data for Peru in this window are shown. Bank credit growth (year over year in total loans) is available for the 18 Jordà-Schularick-Taylor advanced economies.

Inflation (% y/y)
-2002040181918261857
Real GDP growth (% y/y)
-20020181918261857

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 (credit) Real GDP growth is derived as the year-over-year change in real GDP; current account and government debt are percent of GDP; policy rate is the central-bank rate; bank credit growth is the year-over-year change in JST total loans. Methodology

How each source dates this episode

The chronologies disagree on start years and durations. This table is generated from the event rows, not curated: it lists, per crisis type, which source flags which years inside the window.

Sovereign debt
  • Global Macro Database1826, 1850
  • Reinhart-Rogoff1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1850

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Policy-response case studies (external)

For qualitative accounts of how authorities intervened in systemic crises, see the Yale Program on Financial Stability New Bagehot Project, a library of financial-crisis intervention case studies. It is a separate qualitative resource; no specific case is asserted to match this episode.