FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / ESP

Spain

Latest government debt 101.8% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 4 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1820 to 1939.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Spain’s latest debt of 101.8% is 21.1 points above the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Exempt
unclassified by design · as of Jun 26, 2026

Spain has been unclassified throughout the record (1999 to present). High-income OECD and high-income euro-area countries are exempt from the CRC minimum-premium framework: export-credit pricing for these markets follows market terms, so the OECD does not assign them a numeric risk category. This is an exemption by design, not missing data.

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
010020030019501960198020002024PrivateGen govtWEO grossCentral

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
101.8% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
93.6% (2024)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
101.7% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
124.0% (2024)
History
Peak debt
119.2% (2020)
Sovereign crises
4
Last crisis
1939
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
+21.1

Quarterly debt (World Bank QPSD)

A higher-frequency companion to the annual IMF figures above: general government gross debt, quarter by quarter, from the World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database.

Latest quarter (General government)
109.2%
2025Q4 · $2.16T
Annual, for comparison (General government (IMF GDD))
101.8%
2024 · different perimeter and valuation
0.050.0100150199619982000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024

QPSD and the annual IMF WEO/GDD series are not the same measure: coverage of the public sector and the valuation of instruments (nominal, face or market value) can differ, so a quarterly QPSD reading and an annual IMF reading for the same period need not match. Read the quarterly line as within-year timing, not as a re-statement of the annual ratio.

Source: World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt (QPSD) World Bank QPSD, CC BY 4.0. General government gross debt, percent of GDP; 1995Q4 to 2025Q4. Methodology

External debt (World Bank IDS)

No IDS external-debt series for Spain. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics covers low- and middle-income borrowing economies only, so high-income economies are absent by construction.

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

No external debt in default recorded for Spain in the BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database (1960 onward).

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 1936–1939Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1877–1882Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 154.9% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1824–1867Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1820Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Spain sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1823100.0%100.0%$106.1MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1834 crisis →35.0%0.0%$197.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1867 crisis →19.0%12.8%$524.3MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1882 crisis →38.4%54.5%$912.0MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.