FinObservatory

Crisis atlas / ESP / 1824–1867

Spain, 1824–1867

One crisis episode: distinct crisis years merged across gaps of up to two non-crisis years. Types, source agreement, and macro context are drawn from the union of five primary chronologies.

Sovereign debtBanking

Crisis years in this episode

Every distinct (year, type) event inside the 1824–1867 window, with the chronologies flagging it and the count of agreeing sources. Start-year sources (GMD, JST) mark only the first year, so agreement falls in the continuation years.

  1. 1824
    Sovereign debtgmd, rr2 sources
  2. 1825
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  3. 1826
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  4. 1827
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  5. 1828
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  6. 1829
    Bankinggmd, rr2 sources
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  7. 1830
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  8. 1831
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  9. 1832
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  10. 1833
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  11. 1834
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  12. 1837
    Sovereign debtgmd, rr2 sources
  13. 1838
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  14. 1839
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  15. 1840
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  16. 1841
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  17. 1842
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  18. 1843
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  19. 1844
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  20. 1845
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  21. 1846
    Bankinggmd, rr2 sources
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  22. 1847
    Bankingrr1 source
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  23. 1848
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  24. 1849
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  25. 1850
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  26. 1851
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  27. 1852
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  28. 1853
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  29. 1854
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  30. 1855
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  31. 1856
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  32. 1857
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  33. 1858
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  34. 1859
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  35. 1860
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  36. 1861
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  37. 1862
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  38. 1863
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  39. 1864
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  40. 1865
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  41. 1866
    Sovereign debtrr1 source
  42. 1867
    Sovereign debtrr1 source

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Laeven-Valencia banking-crisis detail

This banking episode is not in the Laeven-Valencia systemic banking crises database, which covers systemic banking crises from 1970. The crisis is dated here by other chronologies (GMD, JST, Reinhart-Rogoff, or ESRB), none of which report a fiscal cost or output loss.

Macro context, 1817–1874

Seven years either side of the episode. Each panel has its own scale; the crisis window is shaded. Only indicators with data for Spain in this window are shown. Bank credit growth (year over year in total loans) is available for the 18 Jordà-Schularick-Taylor advanced economies.

Inflation (% y/y)
-50050181718241874
Real GDP growth (% y/y)
-20-1001020181718241874
Policy rate (%)
0246181718241874
Govt debt (% of GDP)
050100150181718241874
Current account (% of GDP)
-4-202181718241874

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 (credit) Real GDP growth is derived as the year-over-year change in real GDP; current account and government debt are percent of GDP; policy rate is the central-bank rate; bank credit growth is the year-over-year change in JST total loans. Methodology

How each source dates this episode

The chronologies disagree on start years and durations. This table is generated from the event rows, not curated: it lists, per crisis type, which source flags which years inside the window.

Sovereign debt
  • Global Macro Database1824, 1837
  • Reinhart-Rogoff1824, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1837, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867
Banking
  • Global Macro Database1829, 1846
  • Reinhart-Rogoff1829, 1846, 1847

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory R6 | Laeven & Valencia (2020, 2026) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | ECB/ESRB Financial Crises Database Methodology

Documented policy responses

12 interventions from the Metrick-Schmelzing banking-crisis database whose recorded year falls inside this episode window (1824–1867). Each row is one documented government or central-bank action, tagged with the database’s own intervention categories and short code, under the crisis code it assigns. Matching is exact: same country, intervention year inside the window. The database’s global-crisis rows (no country) are never matched here.

ESP-1829Spain
  1. Jul-1829LendingAHEL
  2. Jul-1829RestructuringBAIL
  3. Jul-1829RestructuringRES
ESP-1846Spain
  1. 1846-1847RestructuringRES
  2. 1846-1847Regulatory forbearance / rulesSBH
  3. Feb-1847LendingMLA
ESP-1848Spain
  1. 1848LendingAHEL
  2. 1848Regulatory forbearance / rulesORL
  3. 1848Regulatory forbearance / rulesSBH
ESP-1864Spain
  1. Oct-1864No interventionNO/I
ESP-1866Spain
  1. Jul-1866LendingAHEL
  2. Jul-1866Regulatory forbearance / rulesSBH

Source: Metrick-Schmelzing Banking-Crisis Interventions Database (Yale Program on Financial Stability) Cite as: Metrick, Andrew, and Paul Schmelzing, "Banking-Crisis Interventions Across Time and Space," working paper, 2024 (dataset consulted 2026-07-10). License: Creative Commons attribution. Methodology

Policy-response case studies (external)

For qualitative accounts of how authorities intervened in systemic crises, see the Yale Program on Financial Stability New Bagehot Project, a library of financial-crisis intervention case studies. It is a separate qualitative resource; no specific case is asserted to match this episode.