Chinese overseas lending / UKR
Ukraine: debt owed to China
In 2021, Ukraine is estimated to have owed China $1.21bn, equal to 0.6% of its GDP, which ranks it 59 of 126 borrowers in the panel by dollars owed. The estimated stock peaked at $1.91bn in 2015.
The estimated stock, 2000 to 2021
The largest single-year move in the estimated stock is 2015, when it rose by $1.07bn.
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending. Selection: estimated stock owed to China by Ukraine, by year and instrument, 2000 to 2021. Zeros are estimated zeros (no known loans outstanding), not missing values. Methodology
Against what Ukraine reports owing to all creditors
Ukraine reported $136.91bn of total external debt to all creditors in 2021, of which $44.92bn is public and publicly guaranteed. The China estimate is 0.9% of the reported external total and 2.3% of the reported public and guaranteed stock. These are ratios of two different measurements, one estimated and one borrower-reported, and they are not a share of a single consistent total.
| Measure, 2021 | Estimated, owed China | Reported, all creditors | Ratio, % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total external debt | $1.21bn | $136.91bn | 0.9% |
| Public and publicly guaranteed | $1.03bn | $44.92bn | 2.3% |
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending (estimated stocks), and World Bank International Debt Statistics, borrower-reported via the Debtor Reporting System (all-creditor stocks). Selection: estimated external and PPG stock owed to China in 2021 against Ukraine's reported DT.DOD.DECT.CD and DT.DOD.DPPG.CD for the same year. Drawn swap balances are excluded from the estimated column: they are a central-bank liability the Debtor Reporting System's long-term-debt concepts do not carry. Methodology
People’s Bank of China swap drawings
Ukraine carried a drawn swap balance in 1 year of the panel, peaking at $798m. A drawing is a liability to another central bank, and it is not netted out of a headline gross reserves figure.
| Year | Drawn balance | Share of the year’s China total |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | $798m | 41.8% |
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending. Selection: every year in which Ukraine carried a drawn PBoC swap-line balance above zero. Methodology
The same balance measured against gross international reserves, for every country that has drawn
Chinese restructurings involving Ukraine
2 deals recorded between Ukraine and Chinese state creditors. These are context, not accounting: the source records face-value reduction as a flag rather than a magnitude, so no haircut percentage exists for them, and nothing here is netted off the estimated stock above.
Creditor: China Ex-Im Bank
In 2017, China Ex-Im Bank restructured debt under a 2012 3 bn USD credit line with the State Food Grain Corporation of Ukraine (SFGCU) and Ukraine's Ministry of Agriculture (the "loan-for-grain" deal). The contract specified that the $3 billion China Ex-Im Bank loan was to be repaid within 15 years using the proceeds from grain supply contracts between SFGCU and China National Complete Engineering Corporation (CCEC). The first tranche of 1.5 bn USD of the credit line was disbursed with the following financial terms: an interest rate of 6-month LIBOR plus a 4.5% margin, a maturity of 15 years, and a 5 year grace period. Due to loan repayment difficulties, SFGCU and China Ex-Im Bank agreed in 2017 to reduce the loan’s interest rate margin by 150 bps.
AidData 2.0
Creditor: China Ex-Im Bank
In 2014, China Ex-Im Bank rescheduled a 2011 buyer's credit loan extended to SC National Project 'Airexpress', a special purpose vehicle established and guaranteed by the Ukrainian government to carry out the Aeriel Express Project. The original borrowing terms were as follows: 15-year maturity, 3-year grace period, and an interest rate of 6-month LIBOR plus a 3.5% margin. When the project ran into financial difficulties and Ukraine's Ministry of Finance failed to honor its guarantee, China Ex-Im Bank agreed to a 2-year grace period extension.
AidData 2.0
Source: Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch, Hidden Defaults (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9925). Selection: every recorded restructuring agreement between Ukraine and a Chinese state creditor. Face-value reduction is a 0/1 flag in the source, not a percentage; the badge appears only where the source sets it. Methodology