FinObservatory

Sovereign debt / PER

Peru

Latest government debt 30.9% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 5 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1826 to 1997.

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Peru’s latest debt of 30.9% is below the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry the world’s highest ratio without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 3 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jun 20, 2008Category 3 of 7current
Jun 20, 2005Category 4 of 7
Mar 19, 1999Category 5 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 6 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0, and the blank status the OECD has used for these countries since 2013, mark high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies that are exempt because their credit is priced on market terms. An exempt status is unclassified by design, not a data gap and not a zero-risk rating.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt trajectory, 1980 onward

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Central-government debt is mechanically below general government (it excludes state, local and social-security debt). Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private non-financial (GDD)
02040608019501960198020002024PrivateWEO grossGen govtCentral

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; crisis-year shading from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
30.9% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
30.8% (2022)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
32.1% (2024)
Private non-financial (IMF GDD)
49.1% (2024)
History
Peak debt
51.5% (1999)
Sovereign crises
5
Last crisis
1997
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
-49.8

Quarterly debt (World Bank QPSD)

A higher-frequency companion to the annual IMF figures above: general government gross debt, quarter by quarter, from the World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt database.

Latest quarter (General government)
n/a
2025Q4 · $103.54B
Annual, for comparison (General government (IMF GDD))
30.9%
2024 · different perimeter and valuation
10.020.030.040.02010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

QPSD and the annual IMF WEO/GDD series are not the same measure: coverage of the public sector and the valuation of instruments (nominal, face or market value) can differ, so a quarterly QPSD reading and an annual IMF reading for the same period need not match. Read the quarterly line as within-year timing, not as a re-statement of the annual ratio.

Source: World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt (QPSD) World Bank QPSD, CC BY 4.0. General government gross debt, percent of GDP; 2010Q1 to 2025Q4. Methodology

External debt (World Bank IDS)

External debt owed to non-residents, from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, which covers low- and middle-income economies only (Peru is classified Upper middle income). Dollar figures are current US dollars; ratio figures are percentages, as labelled. This is external debt in USD, a different measure from the government debt-to-GDP ratios above; do not compare the two directly.

$93.27B
External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) (2024)
34.2%
External debt stocks (% of GNI) (2024)
$15.23B
Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US$) (2024)
17.1%
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (2024)
11.2%
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
11.9%
Multilateral debt (% of total external debt) (2024)
85.0%
Total reserves (% of total external debt) (2024)
YearTotal external debt% of GNIDebt service
2015$67.83B37.0%$5.53B
2016$70.26B38.2%$7.82B
2017$68.26B33.9%$11.12B
2018$68.74B32.5%$7.32B
2019$64.94B29.5%$8.06B
2020$74.85B38.2%$8.04B
2021$88.98B42.6%$9.20B
2022$91.69B40.0%$7.07B
2023$93.99B37.2%$13.29B
2024$93.27B34.2%$15.23B

Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS) World Bank IDS, CC BY 4.0. Units: current US dollars (.CD series) and percent (.ZS series); repayment-schedule years beyond 2024 excluded. Methodology

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Peru’s government debt in default in 2022, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $89.4M (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2022)Amount in default
Local-currency debt$81.0M
Other official creditors$8.4M
Total external$89.4M

In default (external) for 49 distinct years between 1968 and 2022. Peak external default stock: $17.88B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 1976–19971950–1979
    Debt at start: 33.1% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 19691950–1979
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1931–1951Pre-1950
    Debt at start: 19.9% (General govt (GMD historical))episode →
  • 1876–1889Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1826–1850Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Peru sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1849 crisis →30.2%14.8%$4.2MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1889 crisis →64.8%80.2%$252.2MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1938 crisis →42.2%5.7%$4.2MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1947 crisis →91.8%49.0%$83.1MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1951 crisis →60.6%44.5%$67.2MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1978 crisis →-7.2%0.0%$200.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1980 crisis →-4.6%0.0%$340.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1983 crisis →6.3%0.0%$380.0MCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1997 crisis →63.9%34.2%$10.60BCruces and Trebesch (2013)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1980) the GMD historical series. Central-government readings understate the general-government ratio.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.