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Sovereign debt / VEN

Venezuela

Latest government debt 164.3% of GDP (2024, General govt (IMF GDD)). 8 sovereign-debt crisis episodes on record, 1826 to 2017.

Country financial profile →

Full crisis history (banking, currency, sovereign) →

Venezuela’s latest debt of 164.3% is 83.6 points above the 80.7% median at which sovereign crises of the 2000+ era began. This is a comparison, not a prediction. A country can default well below these medians (Argentina defaulted in 2001 at 48.0% of GDP) or carry one of the world’s highest ratios without defaulting (Japan, above 230%). Default risk turns on debt composition, fiscal capacity, credit history and market access, not the level alone.

Official risk classification

Current classification
Category 7 of 7
0 = exempt, 1 = lowest risk, 7 = highest · as of Jun 26, 2026
EffectiveClassification
Jul 3, 2009Category 7 of 7current
Oct 22, 2004Category 6 of 7
Jun 26, 2003Category 7 of 7
Oct 25, 2002Category 6 of 7
Jun 27, 2002Category 5 of 7
Apr 30, 2001Category 4 of 7
Jan 1, 1999Category 5 of 7

The CRC scores the likelihood a country services its external debt on an eight-step scale, from 0 to 7, and sets the minimum premiums the OECD Arrangement participants charge on officially supported export credit. Categories 1 to 7 are the risk ladder (1 lowest, 7 highest). Category 0 marks high-income OECD and high-income euro-area economies whose credit is priced on market terms. This layer shows category 0 and a blank row as the same exempt state, so an exempt reading is not a zero-risk rating and does not on its own separate an exemption from a market the OECD never classified.

Source: OECD, Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits OECD CRC, free reuse with attribution. Category is an ordinal 0-7 risk step, not a probability; 0 and blank denote exemption. Methodology

Debt to GDP trajectory

Debt to GDP by perimeter, observed years only (no IMF forecast years). Household and nonfinancial corporate IMF GDD series are plotted separately where reported. Where neither component is reported, the private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published) is shown as a coverage fallback, not as a third private component. Shaded bands are sovereign-debt crisis years.

General government (GDD)Central government (GDD)General government (WEO)Private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published)
% of GDP

Source: IMF Global Debt Database (Mbaye, Moreno-Badia & Chae, IMF WP/18/111) | IMF World Economic Outlook Debt is % of GDP; household and nonfinancial corporate GDD series are plotted separately. Where both components are unavailable, the fallback is private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published). Crisis-year shading comes from the sovereign-debt chronologies. Methodology

Debt profile

Latest by perimeter
General government (IMF GDD)
164.3% (2024)
Central government (IMF GDD)
68.5% (2019)
General gov gross (IMF WEO, April 2026 edition)
169.1% (2024)
Private sector, aggregate (no household/corporate split published)
23.8% (2015)
History
Peak debt
336.5% (2020)
Sovereign crises
8
Last crisis
2017
Vs 2000+ crisis-start median
+83.6

External debt (World Bank IDS)

No IDS external-debt series for Venezuela. The World Bank’s International Debt Statistics is compiled from the Debtor Reporting System, so a country is covered only while it reports to that system.

Debt in default (BoC-BoE CRAG)

Stock of Venezuela’s government debt in default in 2024, from the Bank of Canada–Bank of England Sovereign Default Database, broken down by creditor class. The external total is $96.43B (current US dollars, excluding domestic arrears, matching the database’s published headline).

Creditor class (2024)Amount in default
Foreign-currency bonds$53.23B
Other private creditors$16.39B
China (official)$12.00B
Paris Club (bilateral official)$8.69B
Other official creditors$3.60B
Inter-American Development Bank$2.51B
Total external$96.43B

In default (external) for 46 distinct years between 1978 and 2024. Peak external default stock: $96.43B.

Source: BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database 2025 (Beers, Ndukwe & Berry, Bank of Canada SAN 2025-24) BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database, Bank of Canada terms (free use with attribution). Units: current US dollars; total excludes domestic arrears. Methodology

Sovereign-debt crisis history

Each episode with the government debt-to-GDP ratio in its start year, where a reading exists. Episode dates use the same merge as the crisis atlas (consecutive crisis years bridged across gaps of up to two years).

  • 20172000 onward
    Debt at start: 133.6% (General govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 2004–20052000 onward
    Debt at start: 41.8% (General govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1995–19981980–1999
    Debt at start: 45.9% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1982–19901980–1999
    Debt at start: 18.6% (Central govt (IMF GDD))episode →
  • 1898–1905Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1892Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1848–1881Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →
  • 1826–1840Pre-1950
    No debt reading at startepisode →

Source: Global Macro Database 2026_06 (Müller, Xu, Lehbib & Chen 2025) | Reinhart-Rogoff via HBS BFFS | Laeven & Valencia (2020) Methodology

Restructuring history and creditor losses

Every recorded Venezuela sovereign-debt restructuring and the creditor loss (“haircut”) it imposed. The preferred haircut is the present-value measure (Sturzenegger–Zettelmeyer methodology); the face-value column is the headline principal write-down. Amounts restructured are in current US dollars. A crisis link appears where the restructuring year falls inside one of the sovereign-debt crisis episodes above.

YearHaircut (NPV)Face valueDebt restructuredSource
1840 crisis →80.9%0.0%$16.4MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1859 crisis →52.3%1.6%$19.7MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1862 crisis →34.0%0.0%$23.1MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1881 crisis →92.4%60.2%$30.6MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
18932.5%0.0%$12.6MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1905 crisis →39.3%12.9%$25.8MMeyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (2022)
1986 crisis →9.9%0.0%$20.31BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1988 crisis →4.3%0.0%$20.36BCruces and Trebesch (2013)
1990 crisis →36.7%6.8%$19.59BCruces and Trebesch (2013)

Source: Cruces & Trebesch (2013), AEJ: Macro; updated in Graf von Luckner, Meyer, Reinhart & Trebesch (2024), IMF Economic Review Kiel Institute / Trebesch sovereign-haircut database, research use with citation. Haircut and face-value figures are percentages; debt restructured is current US dollars. Methodology

Reading this profile

  • Debt levels mix perimeters. The headline and debt-at-start figures fall back through IMF general government, then central government, then WEO gross debt, then (before 1950) the GMD historical series.
  • Crisis flags end in 2016 (Reinhart-Rogoff) and 2017 (GMD, Laeven-Valencia), while debt runs to 2024. “Years since last crisis” and the absence of recent crises reflect where the sources stop, not a guarantee of calm.
  • Debt level is a weak predictor of default on its own; see the methodology for the debt-intolerance evidence and the full construction.